Ashraf Ghani Blamed for Fall of Afghanistan

If you turn on the TV or radio, it won’t be long before there is a discussion of the fall of Afghanistan. Some say the war that started in 2001 had the goal of clearing out al Qaeda, punishing them for the 9/11 attacks on US soil. That goal was quickly achieved. But the decision was made also to punish the Afghan government, led by the Taliban, for refusing to turn over al Qaeda. That was also achieved, but what to do next?

Twenty years ago, the mission seemed direct, clear and just: Invade Afghanistan and pursue, capture or kill Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, and his armed band of followers.

Achieving that goal also included overthrowing the Taliban, and steadily the mission morphed into a vast, complicated experiment to reshape a society that few Americans understood.

We could have gone home then, and let the Afghan people sort things out, but the people with power were the Taliban, and the warlords they had earlier defeated. Thus, the US ventured into “nation building,” hoping to give the mostly agrarian, Muslim country a western-style democracy. It was an alien concept, and many Afghans, who had been occupied many times by outside forces, never internalized the idea.

On the other hand, after 20 years of relatively liberal administration, a whole new generation—now the majority—only knew the new rights, for women, journalists, and others. It may not be easy to “put the genie back into the bottle.” And the Taliban has hired PR firms to suggest that they will not try.

However, at every announcement promising women’s rights, there has also been the caveat, “in accordance with Sharia Law.” It will be up to the new government to interpret what Sharia Law requires.

There have already been reports of violence by Taliban members. But it should be remembered that the Taliban is not a monolith. Just as it would be unfair to blame “the Republican Party” for the attack on the US Capitol on January 6, it is unfair to blame “the Taliban” for acts of individuals there. It will take time for the Taliban to build a government and establish guidelines of behavior by officials.

So, how did we get to the current situation? It began in February of 2020, with an agreement between the United States and representatives of the Taliban. The two sides came up with four guiding principles.

1. Armed groups will be prevented (by the Taliban and Afghan security forces) from using Afghanistan as a base for acts against the United States and its allies. . .
2. Foreign forces will withdraw from Afghanistan, including U.S. troops and contractors and coalition forces. . .
3. Intra-Afghan negotiations were notionally scheduled to begin on March 10, 2020. . .
4. The agenda for intra-Afghan negotiations will include discussion of how to implement a permanent and comprehensive cease-fire, and a political roadmap for the future of Afghanistan.

As you can see, the negotiations focused on keeping America safe, in exchange for the removal of all foreign forces. It only “suggested” that the Taliban and Afghan government should try to work things out, with no real game plan, and not tied to removal of foreign forces.

Also, just as Obama was criticized for giving a date for withdrawal from Iraq, both Trump and Biden did exactly the same thing in Afghanistan.

The fall to the Taliban was “driven by the fact that both President Trump and President Biden not only announced deadlines for the withdrawal of U.S. military support, but they then cut that support to levels where Afghan forces could not survive and where many Afghan politicians and government figures were willing to stand aside or surrender,” Anthony Cordesman, a veteran analyst for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an essay this week.

The US spent trillions of dollars rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure and training Afghan security forces. By most accounts, the force had become effective—but only with the support and air power of the United States behind them. While, on paper, the force numbered 300,000, the truth was that the real number was about 50,000, with the rest of the names embezzled by leaders. Even then, many of the real troops had gone months without being paid—were left without food, and often without ammunition. They had no real reason to be loyal to the central government.

The current situation is being blamed on our military, and also a failure of intelligence. But as noted, the Afghan forces had been quite effective, and the military can only act based on the information it is given. Who could have guessed that they would collapse immediately? Who? Roya Rahmani, former Afghan ambassador to the United States. In recent interviews, Rahmani has said that the fall of Afghanistan is wholly the blame of the central Afghan government.

“The leadership at one point gave up and told the security forces not to resist,” Roya Rahmani, until last month the Afghan ambassador to the U.S., said this week. “Over the last few weeks, they continuously received calls from Kabul asking them to surrender, asking them not to resist.”

President Ashraf Ghani, himself, said that he chose surrender to “prevent a bloodbath.”

So the failure of intelligence was not in analyzing the capability of Afghan forces. It was in the determination of leaders to maintain the Afghan government. And that should have been known weeks or months in advance.

Reports from several provincial capitals said local elders and tribal chieftains negotiated with advancing Taliban troops, agreeing not to raise arms against them in exchange for a peaceful resolution. Some Afghans say that arrangement extended nationwide.

Again, former Ambassador Rahmani blames President Ghani.

“I’m stunned. I am worried and scared. I feel betrayed. One deception destroyed everything. That betrayal, which former President Ashraf Ghani gave to the country. Of course, he laughed and handed over Afghanistan to the Taliban,” Rhamani said.

The country’s capture by the Taliban was not a failure of the Afghan security forces. They were ready to fight. At that time the army was sent without ammunition. They were not even given air cover. Sufficient logistics were also not provided. The army was forced to eat even leaves. Then at one point the army was ordered to remain a mute spectator and surrender.

While Ghani claimed that peace was possible in June, he later said the Taliban wouldn’t really negotiate unless they suffer serious battleground losses—and by that time, it was obviously not going to happen.

There were many things that led to the fall of Afghanistan: Trump and Biden publishing a specific date for withdrawal, not including the Afghan government in negotiations, and forcing the Afghan government to free thousands of Taliban prisoners.

There was a failure of intelligence regarding the weeks of local governments working with the Taliban, the “ghost troops,” the non-payment and poor arming of Afghan soldiers, and finally, Ashraf Ghani’s orders for security forces to surrender, rather than to fight. He said it was to prevent a “bloodbath,” and that is likely true. His surrender was intended to prevent further deaths among Afghans. That’s only fair, since America’s only concern seemed to be to prevent further deaths among Americans.

We had built an Afghan military that depended on American support. There was no way it could stand on its own. At this point, the issue is not about why Afghanistan fell. Our full attention should now be on finding a way to extricate all Americans and as many American-helping Afghans to get out of the country. And, of course, it is therefore, our responsibility to welcome them as partners into our country.